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The concept of rule-governed behavior or instructional control has been widely recognized for 
many decades within the behavior-analytic literature. It has also been argued that the human 
capacity to formulate and follow increasingly complex rules may undermine sensitivity to 
direct contingencies of reinforcement, and that excessive reliance upon rules may be an 
important variable in human psychological suffering. While the concept of rules would appear 
to have been relatively useful within behavior analysis, it seems wise from time to time to 
reflect upon the utility of even well-established concepts within a scientific discipline. Doing 
so may be particularly important if it begins to emerge that the existing concept does not 
readily orient researchers toward potentially important variables associated with that very 
concept. The primary purpose of the current paper is to engage in this reflection. Specifically, 
we will focus on the link that has been made between rule-governed behavior and derived 
relational responding, and consider the extent to which it might be useful to supplement talk 
of rules or instructions with terms that refer to the dynamics of derived relational responding.   
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The concept of rule-governed behavior or instructional control has been widely acknowledged 
for many decades within the behavior-analytic literature. The concept was originally proposed 
by B.F. Skinner in 1966 in an attempt to explain problem solving behaviors. Specifically, 
Skinner defined a rule as a stimulus or stimuli that specified reinforcement contingencies, 
which allowed the listener to solve problems without directly contacting environmental 
contingencies. For example, the rule ‘boiling an egg takes longer at higher altitudes’ allows 
the listener to adjust the boiling time without undercooking multiple eggs. When experimental 
research began to identify important inter-species differences between the performances of 
humans and non-human animals on schedules of reinforcement (e.g., Bentall, Lowe, & 
Beasty, 1985; Weiner, 1969), the human ability to engage in rule-governed behavior was 
typically used to explain this difference. The basic argument was that the human propensity to 
engage in rule-governed behavior undermined the sensitivity typically observed with non-
human behavior on schedules of reinforcement. Research on rule-governed behavior also 
extended beyond the sensitivity issue when studies began to explore the impact of different 
types of rules (i.e., instructions that simply described a reinforcement schedule versus 
instructions on how to perform on that schedule). 
 The concept of rule-governed behavior has frequently been linked to the distinct 
nature of human psychological suffering. Specifically, it has been argued that excessive 
reliance upon rules and rule-following at the expense of contingency-sensitive behavior may, 
for example, cause an individual to miss out on many opportunities for reinforcement in the 
natural environment, which is associated with depression (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, 
Teasdale, 1978; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Seligman, 1974). The concept of rules, or 
instructional control (note that we will use these terms interchangeably throughout), has also 
been linked to equivalence class formation (see Sidman, 1994) and to derived relations more 
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generally (see Hayes, 1989)1. For example, it has been argued that rules specify contingencies 
because some of the words in a rule or instruction participate in equivalence relations with 
some of the stimuli or events to which the rule refers (Hayes & Hayes, 1989). 
 In general, the concept of instructions or rules would appear to have been relatively 
useful within behavior analysis and few would seriously question this conclusion. However, it 
seems wise from time to time to reflect upon the utility of even well-established concepts 
within a scientific discipline. Doing so may be particularly important if it begins to emerge 
that the existing concept does not readily orient researchers toward potentially important 
variables associated with that very concept. The primary purpose of the current paper, 
therefore, is to engage in that very reflection (see Dixon, Belisle, Rehfeldt, & Root, 2018, for 
a broadly similar reflective exercise). Specifically, we will focus on the link that has been 
made between rule-governed behavior and derived relational responding, and consider the 
extent to which it might be useful to extend the talk of rules or instructions with terms that 
refer to the dynamics of derived relational responding. As explained later in the paper, we use 
the term “dynamics” to refer to the ways in which units of experimental analysis may interact 
with each other.  
 The article will begin with a brief history of the behavior-analytic literature on rule-
governed behavior. It will then consider how the concept of derived stimulus relations has 
allowed for a more precise experimental analysis of human verbal behavior generally, and 
more recently instructional control in particular. We will then consider how recent conceptual 
and empirical developments could be used to advance research in the area of rule-governed 
                                                          
1 The literature on stimulus equivalence and derived relations more generally is focused on reinforcing or 
training specific sub-sets of relational responses such as matching A to B and B to C, and then observing the 
spontaneous emergence of untrained responses such as matching A-C and C-A. Other untrained responses may 
also emerge when a specific function is trained to a stimulus participating in a derived relation (e.g., if A, B and 
C participate in an equivalence relation, and A is paired with a reinforcer, stimulus C may then acquire 
reinforcing functions in the absence of direct pairing). This latter effect has often been referred to as a derived 
transformation of functions.    
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behavior, and examine examples of empirical studies in which this has already begun to 
emerge. Finally, we will argue that, in light of these developments, it may be useful to discuss 
behavior traditionally referred to as rule-governed in terms of the dynamics of derived 
relational responding. 
A Brief History 
 The early years: Instructions and schedule insensitivity. As mentioned above, rule-
governed behavior as a concept was first introduced by Skinner in 1966 and rules were 
defined as contingency-specifying stimuli. This definition of rule governance was frequently 
invoked when attempting to explain human performance on schedules of reinforcement, 
which appeared to differ from the schedule-induced patterns of responding typically observed 
with non-human organisms. For example, both Leander, Lippman, and Meyer (1968) and 
Lippman and Meyer (1967) gave participants minimal instructions for responding on a Fixed 
Interval (FI) schedule (i.e., instructions that did not specify the temporal nature of the 
schedule). The researchers found that two different patterns frequently emerged; a high-rate 
pattern in which responding was maintained at a high rate more or less throughout each 
interval, or a low-rate pattern in which participants emitted only a few or no responses until 
the end of the interval. Critically, these two different patterns appeared to be correlated with 
two different types of self-report when participants were asked about their performances at the 
end of the experiment. Specifically, those individuals who had produced high-rate patterns 
frequently reported that reinforcers were delivered based on the number of responses emitted, 
whereas those who produced low-rate patterns typically reported that reinforcers were 
delivered only after a particular amount of time had elapsed. Based on these initial findings, 
the researchers suggested that human schedule performances were influenced by the types of 
rules that participants generated during exposure to the schedules, rather than through direct 
contact with the scheduled contingencies per se. 
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Related research by Weiner (1964, 1969) involved giving instructions to participants 
that sought to establish these two different types of performance on FI schedules. Specifically, 
if participants were instructed that reinforcers were contingent on number of responses, they 
tended to produce high rate patterns, but if they were instructed that the availability of 
reinforcers was contingent on the passage of time they tended to produce low-rate patterns. 
This research thus demonstrated that instructions appeared to influence the way in which 
participants interacted with reinforcement schedules, which then served to maintain particular 
response patterns, even if the instruction was false. For example, if a participant was told that 
reinforcers were delivered contingent on large numbers of responses, and they responded at a 
high-rate on an FI schedule, although the rule was inaccurate it appeared to be correct because 
reinforcers were indeed delivered regularly following large numbers of responses (during the 
fixed interval). 
Additional evidence that rule-governed behavior was involved in the insensitivity 
effect. Yet further evidence suggesting that verbal rules played a role in schedule insensitivity 
was obtained with infants and young children. For example, Lowe, Beasty, and Bentall (1983) 
found that infant performances on FI schedules closely resembled that of rats and pigeons, 
rather than the high and low rates that had been observed so often with adult humans. The 
authors argued that the nonhuman-like performances produced by the infants could be 
explained by their inability to formulate rules about the contingencies; and thus they 
interacted directly (i.e., with sensitivity) with the schedules.  
Follow-up research by Bentall et al. (1985) repeated the earlier study with infants up to 
and beyond the age of two-and-a-half years. They replicated the earlier findings with young 
infants, but found that older children up to age five years displayed some variations in 
performance. Specifically, some children produced schedule performances similar to those of 
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the young infants, whilst others produced more adult-like patterns. Children over the age of 
five tended to produce patterns that were consistently adult-like (i.e., schedule insensitive).  
Further research also emerged with regard to how, under certain circumstances, it was 
possible to reduce the apparent impact of instructions, thus yielding more non-human-like 
performances even in verbally-able adult participants. For example, some researchers gave 
participants tasks to perform (e.g., mental arithmetic) during exposure to FI schedules in an 
attempt to prevent them from “counting out” the temporal interval (e.g., Laties & Weiss, 
1963). And indeed, these tasks generally disrupted participants’ regular interval performances 
to varying degrees. Other studies provided participants with two different ways in which to 
determine whether a reinforcer was available on a particular schedule of reinforcement 
(Lowe, Harzem, & Bagshaw, 1978; Lowe, Harzem, & Hughes, 1978). Both studies by Lowe 
and colleagues involved a condition in which participants could press a panel to see if a green 
light was on, thus indicating that a reinforcer was available on an FI schedule; in another 
condition pressing the panel provided access to a digital clock that indicated how many 
seconds had elapsed since the last reinforcer was delivered.  
In the “green-light” condition, participants tended to produce a “break-and-run” pattern 
of responding (i.e., an abrupt shift to a high rate of responding), but in the digital timer 
condition, scalloped patterns (i.e., positively accelerated curves) were observed (i.e., the latter 
patterns were similar to the typical non-human patterns produced on FI schedules). The 
authors argued that the scalloped patterns were thus highly sensitive to the scheduled 
contingencies, in that they resembled the response patterns of non-humans on FI schedules. 
The authors went on to argue that in the “green-light” condition participants may have relied 
on self-cues or rules to know when to respond, but in the “digital clock” condition participants 
relied far less on such rules and simply checked the timer whenever they felt they were 
getting closer and closer to the availability of a reinforcer. As such, the latter condition tended 
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to produce behavior patterns that appeared to share the schedule sensitivity observed with 
non-humans (who lacked the ability to generate rules or self-cues to control their schedule 
performances).  
Analyzing rule-governed behavior for its own sake. Much of the early research on 
rule-governed behavior appeared to focus on it as the basis for explaining why (verbal) 
humans often produce behavior patterns that appeared to be insensitive to schedules of 
reinforcement, in the sense that those patterns diverged from non-human-like patterns. During 
the 1980s and ‘90s, however, researchers began to focus more on the impact of rules or 
instructions on human schedule performances for its own sake, rather than as a way of 
explaining why humans and non-humans produced discrepant patterns of responding on 
reinforcement schedules. Indeed, this shift away from insensitivity-focused research could be 
seen as an important milestone in the development of the behavior-analytic study of human 
verbal behavior in its own right. This view was articulated towards the end of the 1980’s by 
Hayes, Zettle and Rosenfarb (1989): 
“The ‘insensitivity’ literature is misnamed. It is not that people become insensitive to 
direct experience – it is that they are relatively sensitive, under many but probably not all 
conditions, to control by verbal stimuli. Control by verbal stimuli is itself ultimately based on 
direct experience, but the experience is now remote, and it is of a special sort, resulting in 
stimulus control with special properties.  
The experimental task is thus not to understand the insensitivity effect per se. When that 
is taken as the task the literature quickly becomes trivialized. For example, papers appear that 
declare that people are in fact controlled by direct experience, if the direct experiences are salient 
enough, important enough, or held in place long enough. This may be true, but it misses the 
point. The value of the so-called insensitivity literature is that it provides a means of studying 
verbal stimuli and verbal behavior. The insensitivity preparation is a preparation, not an end in 
itself.” (pp. 215-216). 
 
In this context, it is worth noting that when research is less focused on the so-called 
insensitivity effect, human schedule performances in naturalistic contexts may approximate 
those performances observed with non-humans (Hantula & Crowell, 2016; Hantula, 
Brockman & Smith, 2008). Of course, similar response topographies in human and nonhuman 
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behavior does not necessarily imply the complete absence of verbal stimulus control for 
humans -- the role and extent of such control remains an empirical matter. 
Historically, the shift from insensitivity-focused research was marked by studies that 
began, for example, to compare the impact of shaping versus instructing behavior on 
schedules of reinforcement. For instance, Shimoff, Catania, and Matthews (1981) compared 
shaped performances to instructed ones on low-rate-responding schedules. In the first 
experiment in this study, low rates of responding were maintained by a Random Interval (RI) 
schedule with a superimposed Differential-Reinforcement-of-Low rate (DRL) schedule. 
When the DRL was relaxed (that is, increased responding would lead to an increase in 
reinforcers), response rate increased for most participants in the shaping group, indicating 
increased contact with the schedule contingencies. For the majority of participants in the 
instructed group, however, response rate did not increase. In a second experiment, the 
researchers replaced the RI schedule with a Random Ratio (RR) schedule. Once again, rate of 
responding increased for the majority of participants in the shaping group when the DRL was 
relaxed, but did not increase for the majority of the instructed participants. The authors argued 
that the greater insensitivity observed in the instructed group was a defining feature of rule-
governed behavior. 
Relatedly, Catania, Matthews, and Shimoff (1982) investigated whether verbal 
formulations of the contingencies within a task that were shaped or instructed were in line 
with participant performance when the schedule contingencies were reversed. During 
interruptions in the schedule before the contingency reversal, one group of participants were 
asked to write down the performance which they thought was required, whilst another group 
were told exactly what to write down (e.g., write “press slowly” for the left button). For those 
participants asked to guess, their guesses were shaped using points worth money as 
reinforcers. When verbal formulations (guesses) had been instructed, responding on the 
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schedule was inconsistent among participants (i.e., responding sometimes corresponded with 
verbal formulations, but sometimes did not). When verbal formulations had been shaped, 
however, responding on the schedule was much more likely to be consistent with the shaped 
guesses, than with the scheduled contingencies.  
Related research focused on the extent to which shaped performance descriptions (e.g., 
“press fast” for the right button)  were in line with, or opposite to, shaped contingency 
descriptions (e.g., the button works “after a random number of presses”) (Matthews, Catania, 
& Shimoff, 1985). Specifically, during interruptions of the schedule, participants were asked 
to fill out sentence guessing sheets, as in Catania et al. (1982). The researchers reported that 
shaping performance descriptions produced responding that was consistent with the 
descriptions, rather than with the schedule. However, shaping contingency descriptions  
produced responding that was schedule-consistent, but inconsistent with the shaped 
descriptions. Overall, these studies demonstrated that it was useful to conceptualize the verbal 
behavior that occurs before and during exposure to a schedule as functionally distinct from 
the performance on the schedule itself.  
In a broadly similar vein, other researchers investigated the interaction between sources 
of reinforcement and instructional control (e.g., Hayes, Rosenfarb, Wulfert, Munt, Korn, & 
Zettle, 1985; Hayes & Wolf, 1984), whilst others examined the impact of different types of 
rules on schedule performance (Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 1986). The latter 
study provides a compelling example of why it is important to examine the subtle interactions 
that may occur between instructions and schedules of reinforcement. Specifically, the study 
highlights the functional properties of these interactions, rather than simply classifying a 
performance as sensitive versus non-sensitive. The researchers gave participants different 
types of instructions prior to a multiple schedule of reinforcement (Fixed Ratio [FR]-18/DRL-
6) that included: (1) no instructions on the appropriate rate of responding; (2) instructions that 
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only specified responding on one aspect of the reinforcement schedule (FR or DRL 
responding, but not both); or (3) accurate instructions that specified responding on both 
aspects of the schedule. Participants responded over two 32-minute sessions (Phase 1), 
followed by an extinction session (Phase 2). When participants failed to demonstrate sensitive 
responding to the contingency changes in the first phase, this was often followed by a failure 
to demonstrate sensitive responding in extinction. However, when participants displayed 
sensitive responding to changes within the first phase, this was often followed by sensitive 
responding in extinction, but only if responding in Phase 1 could not be attributed to an 
experimenter-given, fully accurate instruction. That is, when participants were provided either 
with no rule or a rule that only described part of the schedule contingencies (i.e., Points 1 and 
2 above), sensitivity in Phase 1 correlated highly with sensitivity in extinction. However, 
when participants were provided with an accurate rule that fully described the schedule 
contingencies (Point 3 above), this relationship with sensitivity was not present in extinction.  
The authors argued that while behavior under the influence of rules may appear 
topographically identical to contingency-shaped behavior at first, they may in fact be 
functionally distinct, as shown by the differential responding observed during extinction. 
Indeed, Shimoff, Matthews, and Catania (1986) also demonstrated that behavior that at first 
appears to be contingency-shaped may, under closer inspection, be under the control of 
instructions.  
The type of research reviewed in this subsection clearly highlighted that there was 
considerable value in studying rule-governed behavior or instructional control for its own 
sake (i.e., because it generated an experimental analysis of human verbal behavior). Indeed, 
the work showed that rule-based control could be conceptualized as functionally distinct from 
schedule-controlled responding, even if the two classes of behavior frequently interacted with 
each other. This work involved distinguishing between rules that were simply provided or 
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given to participants (by the researchers) from rules that were first generated by the 
participants and then shaped by the researchers; the former rules tended to produce behavior 
that was less sensitive to changes in schedule contingencies than the latter. The research 
strategy in which rule-governed behavior was separated into different types was also reflected 
in efforts to identify broadly-defined functional classes of rules or rule-governed behavior 
itself, which we will consider in the next section. 
Different types of rule-governed behavior: Pliance, tracking, and augmenting. In 
an attempt to identify broad functional classes of rule-governed behavior, Zettle and Hayes 
(1982) proposed the concepts of pliance, tracking, and augmenting. Pliance was defined as 
rule-governed behavior that is controlled mainly by consequences mediated by the speaker for 
correspondence between the rule and behavior (e.g., when a young child follows the rule “Eat 
your vegetables and I will buy you an ice-cream afterwards”). Tracking was defined as rule-
governed behavior that is controlled mainly by the correspondence between the rule and the 
arrangement of the natural environment (e.g., when a young child follows the rule “Eat all of 
your dinner and you won’t be hungry later”). In the first case, the consequence (i.e., ice-
cream) is actually provided by the speaker and pliance as a response class thus depends on the 
extent to which the speaker, or functionally similar individuals, have actually mediated the 
delivery of reinforcers in the past. In the second case, the consequence may occur in the 
complete absence of any mediation by the speaker, and tracking as a response class thus 
depends upon the extent to which the speaker, or functionally similar individuals, have proven 
to be ‘reliable sources of information’ in the past.  
Finally, augmenting was defined as a type of rule-governed behavior that may occur in 
conjunction with pliance or tracking, and alters the extent to which the consequences 
specified by the rule have reinforcing or punishing value (Törneke, Luciano, & Valdivia-
Salas, 2008). Zettle and Hayes proposed two types of augmentals, namely formative and 
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motivative. In the first case, for example, the statement “This token will get you a free ice-
cream” would be considered a formative augmental if it established the token as a reinforcing 
consequence. In the second case, the statement “It’s really hot today, I bet you’d like an ice-
cream” would be considered a motivative augmental if it momentarily increased the extent to 
which actual ice-cream functions as a potential reinforcing consequence.  
The amount of research generated by these concepts, however, is relatively limited 
(Kissi, Hughes, Mertens, Barnes-Holmes, De Houwer, & Crombez, 2017) and some of the 
research has focused on only one of the concepts, rather than making systematic comparisons 
among them. For example, Zettle and Young (1987) investigated the influence of tracking on 
schedule performance. Specifically, participants were given a computer task in which moving 
a marker to a point on the screen would result in earning a point, after 32 minutes of which an 
extinction phase was initiated. One group of participants were asked to report their guesses 
about how to respond correctly and these guesses were subsequently matched by the task 
contingencies, thus making their guesses always correct (tracking condition). That is, if 
participants reported that number of presses was the important variable, an FR-18 schedule 
was put in place, whereas if time passed was reported as important, a DRL-2 schedule was put 
in place. A second group of participants acted as controls for whom the earning of points was 
yoked to patterns from the tracking group. In extinction, the group in which tracking was 
systematically reinforced took longer to adapt to the contingencies than the yoked control 
group. The authors concluded that these results provided support for tracking as a functional 
class of rule-following. 
In a separate study on pliance, Berry, Geller, Calef, and Calef (1992) investigated the 
extent to which drivers leaving a university car park would comply with a sign instructing 
them to fasten their seat belts in the presence or absence of an observer. If they followed the 
instruction, a message would appear thanking them for doing so (pliance). Results 
14 
 
demonstrated that while the presence of the sign alone did increase the usage of a seat belt, 
the presence of an observer in conjunction with the sign increased compliance even further. 
In one of the very few studies that have referred to the term ‘augmenting’ as the basis of 
the experimental research, Whelan and Barnes-Holmes (2004) reported a complex procedure 
that was designed to create a type of laboratory-induced rule, the details of which are not 
important at this point. The basic strategy involved using the laboratory-induced rule to 
establish a consequential function for a previously neutral stimulus. In effect, the procedure 
could be interpreted as an example of formative augmenting because the consequential 
functions of the stimulus emerged based on a model of instructional control, rather than 
through direct learning.  
Although studies on pliance, tracking, and augmenting have tended to focus on only one 
of these classes of rule-governed behavior, there have been some attempts to explore their 
functional independence. As we shall see, however, the results from these studies have been 
far from consistent. The strategy adopted in several of these studies was to determine if 
sensitivity to pliance and tracking differed between participants who reported high versus low 
levels of depression. For example, Baruch, Kanter, Busch, Richardson, and Barnes-Holmes 
(2007) investigated whether the presence or absence of sub-clinical symptoms of depression 
moderated rule-following, and whether plys or tracks differentially impacted this rule-
following. Depressed and non-depressed individuals were given an instruction about how to 
perform on a subsequent matching-to-sample (MTS) task. Initially the instructions were 
consistent with the contingences of the task, but after a certain number of trials an 
unannounced contingency reversal occurred, after which the instruction was wholly 
inaccurate. Critically, participants had been assigned to a group in which they had to read the 
instruction aloud to the experimenter (pliance) or privately to themselves (tracking) before 
exposure to the task. Participants reporting high levels of depressive symptomatology adapted 
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more quickly to the change in schedule contingencies than did the non-depressed group. No 
effect was found for pliance or tracking, however.      
A similar study by McAuliffe, Hughes, and Barnes-Holmes (2014) investigated the 
same variables: the impact of pliance and tracking on a contingency-switching MTS task, but 
this time in a sample of male adolescents with self-reported high versus low depressive 
symptomatology. As in Baruch et al. (2007), the rule initially corresponded with the 
programmed task contingencies and then reversed, again without warning. Similarly, 
participants assigned to the pliance condition were asked to read their instruction aloud to the 
experimenter and were told that the researcher would monitor their performance. Participants 
in the tracking condition, however, read their instruction privately and were given no 
indication that their performance would be monitored. Low-depressed participants in both the 
pliance and tracking conditions, and high-depressed participants in the tracking condition, 
adapted readily to the contingency change. The high-depressed participants in the pliance 
condition, however, persisted for longer with the now ineffective rule, a result in opposition to 
that reported by Baruch et al. 
Interestingly, other unpublished research (Gorham, 2009) failed to replicate the findings 
from Baruch et al. (2007) and did produce a finding similar to McAuliffe et al. (2014), but 
only under highly specific conditions (i.e., only when participants retained instructions on task 
contingencies for the duration of the experiment). Overall therefore, it appears that the terms 
pliance, tracking, and augmenting have not been widely used as the basis for conducting 
experimental research on instructional control or rule-following, and when they have, the 
effects have not always been consistent. Indeed, in a recent systematic review that focused on 
the terms pliance, tracking, and augmenting, it was argued that the inconsistency in the 
findings may be due in part to the lack of clarity in operationally defining these concepts in 
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the first place (Kissi, et al., 2017; but see Kissi, Hughes, De Schryver, De Houwer, & 
Crombez, 2018).  
Rule-governed behavior and links to clinical phenomena. The focus on clinical 
issues in the context of pliance and tracking unfolded from a general argument that emerged 
in the development of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, et al., 1999). 
Specifically, it has been widely argued that human psychopathology (hereafter referred to as 
human psychological suffering) can be understood in terms of excessive rule-following, 
which by definition undermines or reduces contact with reinforcers in the natural 
environment. Once again, however, the evidence for such a claim remains extremely limited, 
and at least one study has produced evidence that appears contradictory. 
Specifically, Rosenfarb, Burker, Morris, and Cush (1993) investigated the effect of 
shaping versus providing rules on a contingency-switching schedule of reinforcement in 
individuals with and without self-reported depression. Participants responded on a multiple 
DRL-1/FR-1 schedule and were either provided with a rule that accurately described 
responding or were provided with no such rule. After 10 DRL/FR blocks, the task 
contingencies reversed unbeknownst to participants (i.e., the DRL and FR components 
switched). Depressed individuals who were given the rule adapted more quickly to the change 
in schedule contingencies than did the non-depressed participants. No differences were found 
between depressed and non-depressed contingency-shaped groups. 
On balance, a recent study with in-patients formerly presenting with delusional ideation 
appeared to show more persistent rule-following than non-patient controls (Monestes, 
Villatte, Stewart, & Loas, 2014). In the first phase of the experiment, a left hand-side button 
corresponded with an FR8 component of a multiple (FR8/FI18) schedule, whilst a right hand-
side button corresponded with the FI18 component. In the second phase, the contingencies 
were reversed; again participants were not informed about this reversal. Before responding on 
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the schedule, participants were divided into one of three instruction groups: instructions; no-
instructions; or self-instructions. For the instructions group, participants were provided with 
instructions before the task that accurately described how to respond in Phase 1. The no 
instructions group received no instructions for accurate responding. The self-instructions 
group received no instructions before Phase 1, but were asked to write down the best way to 
respond after this phase (before the onset of the reversed schedule in Phase 2). In the presence 
of instructions (directly given or self-produced), patients formerly presenting with delusions 
took longer to adapt to the reversed contingencies than did the controls. That is, when the 
patients received or generated instructions, they were less likely to adapt their behavior in line 
with the contingency reversal than were the non-clinical controls. The authors thus concluded 
that the results provided evidence for excessive rule-following (contingency insensitivity) in 
the behavior of individuals formerly presenting with delusions. 
Overall, it appears that the literature on the role of rule-governed behavior in human 
psychological suffering is scarce and conflicting in nature. Some research suggests that 
excessive rule-governance may be associated with self-reported depression and persecutory 
delusions (McAuliffe et al., 2014; Monestes et al., 2014). In contrast, others have reported 
that individuals with self-reported depression are in fact more sensitive to changes in 
environmental contingencies, or their behavior is less rule-governed (Baruch et al., 2007; 
Rosenfarb et al., 1993).  
Summary and conclusions. The foregoing brief history of the literature on 
instructional control and rules, which began with Skinner’s 1966 paper, suggests that his 
insight led to a wealth of studies that addressed a range of issues directly relevant to human 
behavior. The concept of rule-governed behavior could thus be seen as being of considerable 
benefit, at least in the early years. That is, many interesting effects emerged from this research 
that helped to explain why human behavior so often differed from that of non-human behavior 
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on schedules of reinforcement. On balance, when researchers began to examine rule-governed 
behavior for its own sake (e.g., differences in performances based on shaping contingency 
descriptions versus performance descriptions; shaping behavior versus instructing it, etc.), a 
clear rationale for doing so became less obvious. That is, initially the research was focused on 
explaining why human and nonhuman behavior differed on schedules of reinforcement, but 
when rule-governed behavior per se became the primary focus, a core question or clearly 
defined research agenda appeared to be lacking (i.e., why human and nonhuman behavior 
differed on schedules of reinforcement). Additionally, attempts to identify clear functional 
categories of different types of rules have generally produced inconsistent results.  
Standing back now with the benefit of hindsight, the recognition that a rule (or 
instruction) is a commonsense concept, and lacked a clear functional-analytic basis, was a 
serious problem, at least for behavior analysis. Or more precisely, although researchers could, 
and did, attempt to identify functionally distinct classes of rule-governed behavior (e.g., 
pliance and tracking), a clear functional definition of what it means for a rule to specify a 
contingency was absent. When Sidman and his colleagues’ work on equivalence relations 
resolved the problem of specification (i.e., exactly how rules specify contingencies; see 
below), this could be seen as highlighting the original lack of functional-analytic precision in 
the concept of rules itself. Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason that the research on rule-
governed behavior appeared to be overshadowed by research on stimulus equivalence 
(discussed subsequently). The remaining half of the paper will explore the relationship 
between rule-governed behavior and derived stimulus relations, and the implications of this 
relationship for moving forward in this domain.  
The Link between Rules and Derived Relational Responding 
Another key area within the behavior-analytic literature in which human behavior has 
often been distinguished from that of non-humans is derived stimulus relations. The concept 
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of derived stimulus relations was first formalized with the seminal work of Murray Sidman 
(1971), and his colleagues (see Sidman, 1994, for a book-length treatment). At the time, 
Sidman was attempting to develop procedures for teaching basic reading skills to individuals 
with learning disabilities. A crucial and unexpected finding that emerged from this research 
was that after teaching a small number of simple relations, a number of untaught relations 
emerged. For example, if two abstract stimuli were matched to a third stimulus (e.g., A-B and 
A-C), previously unmatched and unreinforced responses often also emerged (B-C and C-B). 
In more concrete terms, imagine that a child was presented with a picture of a lion and was 
taught to pick the written word ‘lion’ and the written word ‘roar’.  Subsequently, the child 
may spontaneously match the word ‘lion’ with the word ‘roar’ and the word ‘roar’ with the 
word ‘lion’. When such a pattern of responses emerged, the stimuli involved were said to 
form an equivalence class or relation. One of the key driving factors behind the study of 
equivalence relations was the ease with which it was demonstrated with human participants, 
but appeared to be largely absent (or at best extremely weak) in non-humans. In this respect 
therefore, there were now two key ways in which human and non-human behavior differed 
(i.e., rules and derived relations), and indeed, as noted above, Sidman drew upon the concept 
of equivalence relations to solve the issue of specification in instructional control. That is, 
Sidman argued that when a word participates in an equivalence relation with an object or 
event, this provides a functional-analytic definition of what it means for a word to specify or 
to refer to that object or event (see Sidman, 1994, for an extended discussion).    
The extension and elaboration of the study of equivalence relations into what is now 
known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) produced 
laboratory-based models of rule-governed behavior, in which Sidman’s equivalence-based 
definition of specification was formally tested. The critical point here is that equivalence 
relations were treated in RFT as but one class of generalized operant behavior. According to 
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the theory, there are numerous classes of relational operants, including difference, 
comparison, opposition, and temporal relations (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for a 
recent extensive review). A rule or instruction, from the perspective of RFT, involves a 
relational network composed largely of equivalence relations between the words in the rule, 
and the events to which they refer, and the sequencing of the words in accordance with 
specific temporal relations. Thus, the simple instruction “When the light turns green, then go” 
involves equivalence relations between the words “light”, “green”, and “go” and an actual 
light, color, and action, with the words “when” and “then” functioning as cues for temporal 
relations among these events (i.e., green light before go).2 According to RFT, rules or 
instructions involve relational networks and transformations of functions that provides the 
rule with its behavior-controlling properties. In the current example, when the light turns 
green, it may evoke a ‘going’ response in the absence of a direct history of reinforcement. 
Thus, a rule as defined by RFT, extends beyond discriminative control as traditionally defined 
(i.e., as a stimulus with a direct reinforcement history). Indeed, a broadly similar argument 
was offered by other behavior analysts in defining contingency specifying stimuli as function-
altering (Blakely & Schlinger, 1987; Schlinger & Blakely, 1987). Unlike RFT, however, the 
definition did not include a behavioral process by which contingency-specifying stimuli 
acquired their function-altering effects (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001). 
The foregoing RFT conceptual analysis of rules was first tested empirically in a study 
reported by O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, and Smeets (2004) and more recently by 
O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, and Stewart (2014). In the former study, participants first learned to 
respond to abstract stimuli as “similar”, “different”, “before”, and “after” contextual cues. The 
cues were then presented with novel stimuli (nonsense syllables and colored squares) to form 
                                                          
2 The details of RFT and the debate over its relationship with other accounts of equivalence and derived stimulus 
relations (e.g., Naming Theory) will not be discussed here, because this material would extend well beyond the 
scope of the current paper (but see the recent special issue of Perspectives on Behavior Science: Critchfield, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Dougher, 2018, for relevant articles). 
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the functional equivalent of simple instructions, or more precisely relational networks that 
were shown to control specific response sequences (e.g., pressing four colored keys in a 
particular order: blue before red before green before yellow). O’Hora et al. (2014) replicated 
and extended the basic effect by showing that the derived sequence responding reported in the 
earlier study could itself be brought under contextual control. The critical point here is that the 
derived sequence responding occurred in the absence of a direct history of reinforcement, and 
thus provided a potential model of one of the defining features of rule-governed behavior (i.e., 
it allows for problem solving in the absence of direct contingency control). Overall, the 
research served to highlight that the simple concept of rule-governed behavior conceals what 
appears to be highly complex relational phenomena. The remaining sections of the current 
article will attempt to articulate the nature of this complexity and some of its implications for 
future research on rule-governed behavior.  
The Dynamics of Derived Relational Responding as Seen Through the Lens of a Hyper-
Dimensional Multi-Level Framework 
Before we consider the behavioral complexities that may remain hidden when 
researchers rely too heavily on the concept of rules or instructions, it seems important to 
examine a relatively new framework that has been offered for conceptualizing the 
complexities involved in derived relational responding itself (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Luciano, & McEnteggart, 2017; Barnes-Holmes, Finn, McEnteggart, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2018). The framework provides a hyper-dimensional multi-level (HDML) 
“conceptual space” for analyzing the dynamics of derived relational responding and consists 
of five levels and four dimensions3. The five levels of relational development are based on 
conceptual and empirical analyses that have emerged from the literature on RFT (Hayes, et 
                                                          
3 Initially the HDML framework was described as multi-dimensional. More recently, however, the term ‘hyper-
dimensional’ has been used to reflect a more balanced emphasis on the properties of both entailment and 
transformation of functions, which define derived relational responding itself (see Barnes-Holmes, 2018; Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & McEnteggart, in press).  
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al., 2001): (1) mutual entailment; (2) combinatorial entailment; (3) relational networks; (4) 
relating relations; and (5) and relating relational networks. In identifying these as levels of 
relational development, the HDML framework is not indicating that they are rigid or invariant 
“stages.” Rather, lower levels (e.g., mutual entailing) are seen as containing patterns of 
derived relational responding that may provide an important historical context for the patterns 
of relational responding that occur in the levels above (e.g., combinatorial entailment). We 
will describe each of the levels here only briefly because they have been considered in many 
other sources since the publication of the seminal text on RFT (Hayes, et al., 2001; see 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for a recent detailed summary).  
Mutual entailing refers to the bi-directional nature of verbal relations (e.g. If A is more 
than B, then B is less than A). Relational framing, at its simplest, involves a combination of 
two mutually entailed relations (e.g. If A is more than B and B is more than C, then A is more 
than C). Relational networking involves combinations of different patterns of relational 
framing (e.g. If A is the same as B and B is the same as C, and C is more than D, and D is 
more than E, then E is less than A, B, C and D). Relating relations involves, at its simplest, 
relating a mutually entailed relation to another mutually entailed relation (e.g. If A is the more 
than B, and in a separate relation C is more than D, then the relationship between the two 
relations, A>B and C>D, is the same). Relating relational networks is similar to relating 
relations, except that it applies to separate relational frames or separate complex relational 
networks.  
The critical advance that the HDML framework provides is that the five levels of 
relational development are also divided along four dimensions: (1) coherence; (2) complexity; 
(3) derivation; and (4) flexibility (see Table 1). A brief description of each of the four 
dimensions is as follows. Coherence refers to the extent to which a pattern of derived 
relational responding coheres with previously established patterns of such responding. For 
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instance, if an individual is informed that stimulus X is bigger than Y, and is subsequently 
told that stimulus Y is smaller than X, the latter statement would likely be deemed coherent 
with the former. In this instance, coherence would be relatively high because the overall 
pattern (X>Y = Y<X) coheres so consistently with the manner in which such verbal relations 
have been established by the wider verbal community (e.g., there are few instances in which 
the statement, “if X is bigger than Y, then Y is bigger than X” would be reinforced, or not 
punished/corrected, by an English-speaking listener).  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Complexity refers to the level of detail or density of a particular pattern of derived 
relational responding. For example, the mutually entailed relation of coordination may be 
seen as less complex than the mutually entailed relation of comparison, because the former 
involves only one type of relation (e.g., if X is the same as Y, then Y is the same as X), but 
the latter involves two types of relations (if X is bigger than Y, then Y is smaller than X).  
Derivation refers to the extent to which a particular pattern of derived relational 
responding has previously been “practiced” or emitted. Within the HDML framework, each 
time a relation is derived, its derivation reduces because it acquires its own history that 
extends beyond the derivation that is made from the “baseline” relation. Imagine, for 
example, that an individual learns that X is bigger than Y, and thus derives that Y is smaller 
than X. The first time that the Y<X relation is derived, it is derived “directly” from the X>Y 
“baseline” relation. However, if the individual subsequently continues to respond to Y as 
smaller than X, that relational response gradually acquires its own history, irrespective of 
whether or not it is directly reinforced, rendering it less and less derived from the original 
baseline relation (i.e., X bigger than Y). 
 Flexibility refers to the extent to which a given instance of derived relational 
responding may be modified by current contextual variables. As a simple example, imagine a 
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young child who is asked to respond with the wrong answer to the question, “Which is bigger, 
a mouse or an elephant?” The more rapidly the child responds with “mouse”, the more 
flexible the relational responding (see O’Toole & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). Of course, 
flexibility is always context dependent and thus if the child had been “warned” previously not 
to give a wrong answer when asked to do so, it would be difficult to use the production of a 
correct or wrong answer as an indication of flexibility. 
Although the HDML framework may appear to be quite daunting at first, it is 
important to appreciate that the framework simply aims to make explicit what basic 
researchers in RFT have been doing implicitly since the theory was first subjected to 
experimental analysis. That is, whenever a basic researcher in RFT conducts a study, this 
often involves combining at least one of the levels with one or more of the dimensions of the 
HDML framework. For instance, even in a simple study on equivalence relations, the 
researcher selects a level (e.g., mutual entailment or symmetry) and then must specify how 
many trials will be used to test for the entailed symmetry relations (e.g., 10), and how many 
trials must be “correct” to define the performance as mutual entailment (e.g., 8/10). In effect, 
the number of opportunities to derive the entailed relations has been specified (i.e., 10), and 
the number of responses that must cohere with the relations is also determined (i.e., 8). At this 
point, therefore, the level (mutual entailment) and two of the dimensions (derivation and 
coherence) of the HDML framework have been invoked. If relations other than symmetry are 
introduced to the study, or programmed forms of contextual control are involved, then 
relational complexity is also manipulated. Furthermore, if the researcher attempts to change 
the test performances in some manner (e.g., by altering the baseline training), then the 
relational flexibility in the original test performances can also be assessed. 
As noted previously, researchers in the area of derived stimulus relations have been 
doing this type of work for decades. Thus, the HDML framework simply makes these 
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scientific behaviors more explicit, by situating them in a framework that specifies 20 
intersections between the widely-recognized levels of relational development identified in 
RFT and the dimensions along which the levels have been or could be studied. 
At this point, it seems important to emphasize that the 20 intersections identified 
within the HDML framework are the units of experimental analysis, while the levels 
and the dimensions per se are not. For example, although it is possible to state that mutual 
entailment is the bidirectional relation between two stimuli, mutual entailment can only 
be analyzed experimentally by specifying one or more of the dimensions. As noted 
previously, the tested relation must cohere in some pre-specified manner with the trained 
relation (e.g., if X is bigger than Y, then Y will be smaller than X), and the number of 
derived relational responses must be specified (e.g., a participant must produce at least 
8 out of 10 responses indicating that Y is indeed smaller than X in the absence of 
programmed reinforcement, prompting, or other feedback). 
A detailed treatment of the HDML framework is beyond the scope of this article (see 
Barnes-Holmes, 2018; Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2017; Barnes-Holmes et al., in press, for 
additional details). The critical point, however, is that when the study of derived relational 
responding is viewed through the lens of the HDML framework, its potential in helping 
researchers analyze the complexities and dynamics of human language and cognition 
(including, most importantly in the current context, rule-governed behavior) may become 
apparent. In the next section, we will elaborate this argument by considering some recent 
empirical research on derived relational responding and persistence in rule-following. 
Integrating the study of derived relational responding with persistent rule-
following: Implications arising from the HDML framework. Until recently, research 
attempting to integrate the work on derived stimulus relations and persistent rule-following 
was somewhat lacking. However a study by Harte et al. (2017) attempted to fill this gap and 
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the interpretation of the study’s results was largely aided by the HDML framework. Across 
two experiments, participants were given either a direct rule (Direct Rule Condition) or a rule 
that involved a novel derived relational response (Derived Rule Condition) that specified 
initially accurate responding on the subsequent MTS task. In Experiment 1, all participants 
first responded on 10 trials in which the rule was consistent with the task contingencies, 
followed by an un-cued contingency reversal. Participants then responded on 50 more trials in 
which the rules no longer matched the contingencies. Experiment 2 partially replicated 
Experiment 1, but here participants were provided with 100 trials before the contingency 
reversal (rather than 10). While no significant differences emerged in rule persistence between 
direct and derived rule conditions in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2, participants in the Direct 
Rule Condition demonstrated significantly more persistence than did those in the Derived 
Rule Condition. That is, only when participants had 100 opportunities to follow the reinforced 
rule (rather than only 10), did the nature of the rule impact on rule persistence. Furthermore, 
the only correlations that emerged between rule persistence and psychological distress were in 
the Direct Rule Condition. 
When viewed through the lens of the HDML framework, it could be argued that lower 
levels of derivation (as in the Direct Rule Condition) produced greater levels of persistence 
than higher levels of derivation (as in the Derived Rule Condition).4 Thus, it appeared that 
persistence in rule-following may have varied as a function of level of derivation. This 
interpretation, however, does not address the fact that level of derivation appeared to have 
little impact on rule persistence when the opportunity to follow the reinforced rule was 
relatively brief (10 trials before the contingency switch in Experiment 1). When once again 
viewed through the lens of the HDML framework, it could be argued that coherence (between 
                                                          
4 From an RFT point of view, even the Direct Rule Condition involved some level of derivation, given that all 
human verbal behavior is derived from a history of arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Thus, the Direct 
Rule Condition involves a low level of derivation, while the Derived Rule Condition involves a high level of 
derivation (see Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2017, for a detailed discussion). 
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the rule and the contingencies) may interact dynamically with levels of derivation (within the 
rule itself) to impact persistence in rule-following. That is, when coherence between the rule 
and contingencies was high (100 trials in Experiment 2), level of derivation, within the rule, 
impacted upon persistent rule-following; but when coherence was low, level of derivation did 
not impact rule persistence. In simpler terms, participants may have been much more certain 
that the rule was ‘correct’ when exposure to the contingencies was more protracted. If this 
interpretation is correct, it suggests that the relationship between level of derivation and rule 
persistence is moderated by coherence (the dynamical relationship between coherence and 
derivation is discussed below).  
In the context of the Harte et al. (2017) study, the HDML framework allowed for a 
more detailed interpretation of the results than that offered by the term rule-governed behavior 
per se. Critically, the HDML interpretation also suggested a future avenue of inquiry. Indeed, 
Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, and McEnteggart (2018) conducted a follow-up study 
to test the suggestion that level of derivation, as manipulated directly within the experiment, 
impacted rule persistence. That is, would a condition that involved low levels of derivation 
produce more persistent rule-following than a condition that involved high levels of 
derivation? The study also sought to examine the impact of high versus low levels of 
derivation across two levels of the HDML framework, that is, mutual entailment (Experiment 
1) and combinatorial entailment (Experiment 2). Results showed more persistence in rule-
following when derivation was low rather than high, at both levels of mutual and 
combinatorial entailment.  
In the study by Harte et al. (2018), level of derivation was directly manipulated by 
providing different amounts of training. In a more recent unpublished study conducted by our 
research group we held derivation constant and explored the impact of coherence on persistent 
rule-following. Coherence was manipulated through the systematic use of feedback, based on 
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the assumption that manipulating corrective feedback would impact upon level of coherence 
(e.g., providing feedback for “correct” derived responding would likely increase coherence). 
Across two experiments, all participants were first trained on the same set of baseline 
relations as in Harte et al. (A-B/B-C). What followed this baseline training then differed by 
experiment. In Experiment 1, participants were then retrained on the same baseline relations 
for two further blocks of trials, with one group receiving feedback on their performances and 
another group receiving no performance feedback. Following baseline training in Experiment 
2, however, participants were directly tested on the derived A-C relations for two further 
blocks of trials. Once again, half of participants received feedback on their performance while 
half did not. Thus, while derivation was still held constant, as in Experiment 1, in Experiment 
2 it was tested directly (i.e., participants were given the opportunity to derive the relations, 
rather than simply being retraining on the baseline relations). Thus, in principle, level of 
derivation was lower for Experiment 2 than Experiment 1 and was assessed in separate but 
related ways (i.e., retraining the baseline relations with and without feedback, versus testing 
the derived relations with and without feedback). Participants in both experiments then 
completed the contingency switching MTS task. 
Manipulating coherence, through the provision versus non-provision of feedback, 
impacted on persistent rule-following, but only when participants were given the opportunity 
to derive the A-C relations (i.e., there appeared to be little if any impact for participants in 
Experiment 1 who were simply re-exposed to the A-B and B-C relations, but there was a 
significant impact in Experiment 2). In effect, coherence (manipulated via feedback) appeared 
to have a clear impact on persistent rule-following when derivation is relatively low (i.e., is 
tested with or without feedback) but little if any impact when derivation is relatively high 
(i.e., when the baseline relations necessary for derivation were presented with or without 
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feedback). 5 The important point here is that the subtleties in persistent rule-following, in the 
face of reversed reinforcement contingencies, are only now being revealed when the variables 
highlighted within the HDML framework are subjected to systematic analysis. The original 
concept of rule-governed behavior did not include specific reference to the dimensions 
identified within the HDML framework. Consequently, one could argue that the original 
concept (of rule-governance) was not sophisticated enough for researchers to appreciate the 
subtleties involved in excessive rule-following. In our view, any account of excessive rule-
following, and its involvement in human psychological suffering, will therefore be inadequate 
without taking on-board these subtleties.     
Of course, one could argue that the empirical work outlined above could have been 
done without the HDML framework, and indeed, it is difficult to argue against a 
counterfactual. The important point, however, is the extent to which other researchers 
interested in complex human behavior find the framework useful, and this remains to be seen. 
At this point, it may be of benefit to provide a number of brief interpretations of earlier work 
on rules described in the first half of this paper, but viewed through the lens of the HDML 
framework. This may further highlight the utility of the framework for identifying the 
complexities in performances, over and above the explanatory power of rules per se. At the 
very least, engaging in this exercise could help orient researchers towards areas of inquiry that 
may not be immediately obvious without the HDML framework. Before proceeding, we 
                                                          
5 It should be emphasized that the dimensions of coherence and derivation as conceptualized within the HDML 
framework may not be entirely separable. Indeed, Barnes-Holmes et al. (2017) highlighted that the boundaries 
among the dimensions and levels within the MDML (subsequently HDML) were “fuzzy” (p.14). Furthermore, 
the main focus of the framework is to emphasize the dynamics involved in the various properties of arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding. Thus increases in one dimension may be seen as involving decreases in a 
second dimension. For example, attempting to increase coherence by providing performance feedback on a block 
of A-C trials would likely reduce level of derivation simply because responding on those trials itself involves 
deriving. Nevertheless, providing feedback versus no feedback may be one way to manipulate coherence directly 
while recognizing that derivation may also be impacted. Although the inseparable and dynamic nature of the 
units specified within the HDML framework might be seen as a weakness, it is one shared with many concepts 
in behavior analysis, such as the relationship between the eliciting and reinforcing functions of a stimulus. 
Ultimately, such distinctions stand or fall based on their utility within the basic science and its applications. Only 
time will tell if the HDML distinction between coherence and derivation, and indeed the distinctions made 
among the other dimensions, prove to be sufficiently useful to retain them within our scientific vocabulary.  
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would like to emphasize that the following are simply examples of possible interpretations of 
earlier research on rule-governed behavior, not definitive RFT explanations. We thus offer 
them here simply as verbal stimuli designed to facilitate further debate, as well as conceptual 
and empirical analyses.      
High versus low rates on FI schedule performances. The earliest research on 
schedules of reinforcement with human participants, showing that response rates were either 
consistently high or low throughout an FI schedule, may be readily interpreted in terms of 
relational networks generated by an individual’s contact with the contingencies. Imagine, for 
example, a participant who emitted only one or two responses during the first trial on an FI 
schedule versus a participant who emitted a large number of responses. It seems likely that 
two different relational networks would be generated by these separate interactions with the 
contingencies. In the first case, the network would likely include references to time, rather 
than response rate, whereas the latter network would include references to response rate rather 
than time. In both cases, the relational network would likely increase in coherence because 
responding in accordance with that network would lead to the delivery of reinforcement. Of 
course, the coherence of the ‘response-rate network’ would be undermined if a participant 
spontaneously stopped responding for a period of time during one of the FI trials (because a 
reinforcer would be delivered for the first response emitted after the interval had elapsed). In 
this sense, the high-rate performance would not be seen as “insensitive” to the contingencies, 
but instead reflecting the relative coherence of a contingency-induced relational network. 
Developmental differences in FI schedule performances. The findings reported in the 
late 1970s and ‘80s indicated a gradual developmental transition from the nonhuman-like 
performances of human infants to adult-like performances by age five years and above. The 
interpretation of this developmental trend appears relatively straightforward in terms of the 
HDML framework. Specifically, it seems likely that the relational abilities of infants are 
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insufficient to allow for the generation of relatively complex relational networks as they 
interact with even relatively simple schedules of reinforcement. Certainly, human infants 
would be unable even to generate complex relational networks that would function to control 
behavior on the schedule. As an infant matures into early childhood (between two and four 
years), the extent to which exposure to an FI schedule would generate the types of relational 
network that would control adult-like performances would increase. Specifically, limited 
forms of relational framing would certainly be present by two or three years of age, but the 
types of networks that are composed of multiple interrelated relational frames, with 
appropriate forms of even relatively limited contextual control, would only be expected by the 
fifth and sixth year of development. Furthermore, the extent to which the generation of those 
networks would then serve to control performance on the schedule in a consistent and reliable 
manner would also require some experience (i.e., in technical terms, reductions in level of 
derivation, increases in coherence, etc.) in deriving, and responding in accordance with, 
relational networks in the natural environment.  
The impact of interval-related stimuli on FI schedule performances. Numerous 
studies showed that presenting various stimuli and/or tasks during FI schedules tended to 
induce nonhuman-like performances (i.e., scalloped patterns). Such a finding does not 
necessarily indicate that the stimuli and/or tasks rendered contingency-sensitive performances 
that were functionally identical to those observed with nonhumans. For example, presenting 
participants with a digital clock that counted down the seconds until the end of an FI schedule 
may have served to generate a relational network that controlled a behavior that 
topographically resembled a nonhuman performance. In effect, the relational network now 
included reference to the output of the clock as a source of behavioral control (e.g., “keep 
checking the timer before responding”). In so far as this particular network helped the 
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participant to judge the length of the interval, the coherence of the network would increase 
and its derivation would decrease as the experimental session progressed.    
Shaped contingency descriptions versus performance descriptions. One of the key 
findings in this area was that shaping performance descriptions produced responding that was 
consistent with the descriptions, rather than with the schedule. However, shaping contingency 
descriptions produced responding that was schedule-consistent, but inconsistent with the 
shaped descriptions. These findings suggest that the shaping was impacting upon relatively 
complex relational networks and these networks acquired functionally distinct controlling 
properties in terms of actual schedule performance. If the networks were coordinated with 
actual performance, less schedule sensitivity was observed than if the networks were 
coordinated with the schedule. When viewed through the lens of the HDML framework, 
therefore, the focus is on how specific relational networks are generated (i.e., through 
shaping) and the functional properties of those resulting networks on schedule performance. 
The question of schedule sensitivity per se is thus seen to be too simplistic or completely 
redundant.    
Distinguishing between rules provided by a researcher and rules generated by 
participants and then shaped by the researcher. The foregoing conclusion is also reflected in 
another line of research. In a study reported by Hayes et al. (1986), participants were exposed 
to complex schedules of reinforcement (i.e., schedules that required switching from high to 
low rates of responding). Some participants were provided with no instructions on how to 
respond, whereas others received instructions on how to respond during one component of the 
schedule, and a third group received instructions on how to respond on both components. All 
participants were then exposed to a period of extinction. The key finding was that sensitivity 
to extinction was most pronounced when participants were provided with no rule or a rule that 
only described part of the schedule. This result indicates that when a relational network is 
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generated by the participant interacting with the scheduled contingencies, rather than being 
fully instructed, higher levels of sensitivity (at least to extinction) are observed subsequently. 
This suggests that the source of a particular relational network may differ in levels of 
coherence, derivation, and flexibility, contingent on the original source of that network (i.e., 
whether it is fully or partly instructed or being generated through interactions with the 
scheduled contingencies). Once again, focusing on the variables highlighted in the HDML 
framework, as important properties of relational framing itself, appears to provide a more 
sophisticated understanding of how instructional control actually functions, at least in 
laboratory settings. 
Distinguishing between different types of rule-governed behavior (pliance, tracking, 
and augmenting). As noted earlier, research on distinguishing different types of rules failed 
to yield reasonably consistent findings (see Kissi, et al. 2017, for a recent review). One of the 
key problems, as highlighted by the authors of the recent review, was that the distinctions 
made among pliance, tracking, and augmenting lacked precision, at least at a functional-
analytic level. However, when rules are interpreted as relational networks, that may vary 
along multiple dimensions (coherence, derivation, complexity, and flexibility), a more 
desirable level of functional-analytic precision may be achieved, one that will serve to 
generate more consistent findings across studies than we have managed thus far. At the very 
least, therefore, if the concepts of pliance, tracking, and augmenting are to be retained, the 
dimensions and levels specified in the HDML framework may be helpful in refining those 
concepts in a functional-analytic way. On balance, retaining these concepts (pliance, tracking 
and augmenting) may turn out to be redundant as more sophisticated accounts of behavioral 
control by relational networks emerges both empirically and conceptually in the literature. 
A related point, at least with regard to augmentals, is the extent to which they could be 
defined as verbal motivating operations (MOs), where ‘verbal’ involves derived relational 
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responding (see Poling, 2001; Poling, Lotfizadeh, & Edwards, 2017; Lotfizadeh, Edwards, & 
Poling, 2014, for extended discussions of the need to deal with the impact of verbal behavior 
on MOs). However, the disadvantage in equating the concept of an augmental with that of a 
verbal MO, is that the same criticisms leveled at the MO would then apply equally to 
augmentals (Poling et al., 2017). Indeed, as pointed out by one of the reviewers of the current 
article, even if the two concepts are not equated, at least some of the criticisms of the MO 
continue to apply to the concept of the augmental. Furthermore, a recent attempt to update 
RFT has addressed the issue of motivation without reference to the concept of augmenting 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., in press). It should be stressed that this updated version of RFT 
recognizes that motivation per se is an important variable, but is now incorporated into the 
HDML framework (see also Gomes et al., 2019). Thus, although some researchers have 
previously defined augmentals as verbal MOs or verbal establishing operations/stimuli (e.g., 
Fagerstrøm & Arntzen, 2013; Ju & Hayes, 2008; Laraway, Snycerski, Olson, Becker, & 
Poling, 2014; Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & O’Hora, 2002; Valdivia, 
Luciano, & Molina, 2006), the usefulness of doing so remains an open question given 
potential problems with the application of the concepts of augmentals and MOs to verbal 
stimuli that have motivational functions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 The extended quotation from Hayes et al. (1989) presented earlier in current article 
made the critically important point that the concept of human insensitivity (to direct 
contingencies) should be seen as highlighting the ubiquity and power of verbal stimuli. 
Almost 30 years later, that message rings far louder today than it did then. Indeed, the current 
article is in a sense a recapitulation and an elaboration of that very message. In 1989, the 
study of rule-governed behavior was very much in the spotlight of behavior-analytic research 
and had been for some years, as evidenced by the very title of the volume from which the 
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quotation is drawn. The study of equivalence relations was also emerging strongly in the 
behavior-analytic literature at that time, but the study of multiple stimulus relations was 
barely evident. Indeed, the first detailed treatment of multiple stimulus relations, and their 
potential relationship with rule-governed behavior, appeared in the same volume, and it was 
only two years later that the first empirical study appeared in the flagship journal of the 
discipline (Steele & Hayes, 1991). It was another 10 years before a book-length treatment of 
multiple stimulus relations, in the form of RFT was published (Hayes et al., 2001), which 
contained an account of verbal stimuli that could be used to develop a functional-analytic 
understanding of rule-governed behavior. An experimental analysis of how derived stimulus 
relations and rule-governed behavior might be combined has been slow to emerge (O’Hora et 
al., 2004, 2014). It is our hope that recent developments in RFT, as summarized in the current 
article, may serve to stimulate a greater interest in defining and studying rule-governed 
behavior as responding in accordance with complex relational networks, along various 
dimensions and levels as specified within the HDML framework. 
 In making the foregoing arguments, we are not suggesting that the concept of rule-
governed behavior be banished from behavior-analytic discourse. Rather, the concept should 
be seen as an important place holder or verbal stimulus that serves to orient the researcher 
towards a critically important domain in the experimental analysis of human behavior. Indeed, 
as Vaughan (1987) argued over 30 years ago, “… if rule-governed behavior is to be a 
technical term, then it is fitting for behavior analysts to argue that a functional definition is 
needed …, even though others seem content with a descriptive one …. (p.99).”  
In closing, we should emphasize that it was not our intention in the current article to 
‘destroy’ the concept of rule-governed behavior, but rather to extend and refine it by bridging 
a gap between two areas of research within behavior analysis that have remained largely 
separate. In bridging that gap, it appears that increasing technical precision may be achieved 
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by focusing on the types of variables contained in the HDML framework that impact upon 
rule-governed behavior. In this sense, the current article should be seen as an attempt to 
elaborate upon and extend the seminal work of two intellectual giants in the field of behavior 
analysis (B.F. Skinner and Murray Sidman) who gave us, respectively, the concepts of rule-
governed behavior and derived stimulus relations. Whether or not the increased precision we 
offer here allows for the concept of rule-governed behavior to be considered a full-blown 
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A Hyper-Dimensional Multi-Level (HDML) Framework comprised of 20 intersections 
between five levels and four dimensions. In previous publications, these units of experimental 
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